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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Biosecurity concerns protection from the risks posed by organisms to the economy, to 
the environment and to people's health, through exclusion, eradication and control.  In 
November 2000 the Government decided to develop a comprehensive biosecurity 
strategy for New Zealand.   
 
Part of the context for the strategy is that growing trade and passenger traffic has 
increased the risks to: 
 
•  the production sector; 
•  the indigenous plant and animal environment that is unique in many respects and is 
also fragile; 
•  public health through the establishment of disease vectors such as mosquitoes.  
New Zealand is not alone in seeking to manage these risks, which constitute a global 
problem, often exacerbated by institutional, management and research deficiencies 
(Green, 1999).   
 
The purpose of this paper is to review, at a general level, the regulatory issues 
involved.  The paper also addresses the related issues of risk analysis and cost 
recovery.  These issues are addressed under two headings: biosecurity at the border 
and beyond, and biosecurity within New Zealand.  The rationale for treating these two 
areas separately is that their regulatory frameworks, and associated risk analysis and 
cost recovery issues, differ considerably.  The two are of course related: biosecurity 
measures within New Zealand only arise where unwanted organisms have crossed the 
border.  Biosecurity measures are applied at both stages on the grounds that: 
 
•  biosecurity measures at the border or pre-border stages are normally more cost-
effective;  
•  there can be additional gains to eradicating or controlling pests or unwanted 
organisms that have got past the border and have become (or are becoming) 
established
1. 
Biosecurity regulation both at the border and beyond, and within New Zealand, is 
mostly contained in the Biosecurity Act 1993, which consolidated a number of earlier 
statutes.  This paper focusses on that Act.  The paper does not address the Hazardous 
Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (HASNO), which regulates the deliberate 
(as opposed to accidental) introduction of new organisms.  
 
Biosecurity programmes have particular features that are of interest from a regulatory 
perspective.  First, they contribute to public (or in some cases club) goods, by 
maintaining or reducing the current level of biosecurity risk to primary production, and 
to biodiversity and public health.  Second, some biosecurity breacjhes are practically 
irreversible once they occur.  Third, the need for them arises from the actions – 
                                                 
1 Note though that the ‘law of diminishing returns’ can apply markedly in these circumstances.  
Even if a high percentage of pests can be eradicated at any one time, if reproductive ability 
and food supply are not affected then the population will recover quickly – so biosecurity 
measures will bring temporary benefits only.    
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deliberate or inadvertent  - of particular groups such as importers and incoming 
passengers.  Incursions cannot usually be traced back to individuals, though, which 
points to a regulatory- rather than a tort- or liability-based approach
2.   
 
Bertram (1999) has estimated the annual cost of defensive e xpenditures on 
biosecurity, and of production losses from major pests: 
 
  $m 
Defensive expenditures   
- central government  195 
- regional councils  25 
- production sector  220 
Production losses   
- Argentine stem weevil  165 
- rabbits  50 
- possums  40 
- other  145 
Total quantified  840 
 
 
NZIER (2000) surveys general economic issues in biosecurity.  It concludes that: 
 
•  the same economic principles apply to biosecurity as to other accident protection; 
•  biosecurity programmes can be assessed against effectiveness, efficiency, and 
equity criteria; 
•  equating the marginal costs and benefits of additional biosecurity will likely show 
that some residual level of risk is too costly to eliminate; 
•  economics offers useful principles for allocating and recovering the costs of 
biosecurity programmes. 
 
                                                 
2 A liability-based approach might also run foul of New Zealand’s obligations under the SPS 
agreement.  See Sinner and Gibbs (1998).  
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2.  BIOSECURITY AT AND BEYOND THE BORDER 
2.1. Benefits and costs 
Identifying the benefits and costs of biosecurity restrictions on the entry of goods and 
people can be complicated by different views of the ‘counterfactual’: benefits and costs 
compared to what?  No biosecurity restrictions at all, or no biosecurity risks at all?  In 
what follows we adopt an incremental approach.  This involves starting off from the 
current state of the world – including its current risks and restrictions – and identifying 
the benefits and costs of incremental changes.  Not all actions may constitute 
restrictions.  For example the issue of an import health standard, that sets conditions 
under which a particular risk good
3 may be imported, will not constitute a biosecurity 
restriction if it replaces a complete ban on imports of that good. 
 
That said, the potential benefits of additional biosecurity restrictions imposed at the 
border (or beyond) take the form of a reduction in biosecurity risks to production, to 
biodiversity and to public health.  
 
On the cost side, additional biosecurity restrictions at the border or beyond constitute a 
restraint on trade.  Biosecurity measures can apply not just to plant and animal 
materials and products, but also to any other goods that have been packed in or have 
been contaminated by them.  Economic costs arise in that goods are subject to 
inspection, and possibly to treatment, destruction, or a ban on entry.  Some goods will 
not be shipped in the first place.  These will all be reflected in reduced opportunities to 
import, or more expensive imports of, consumption and investment goods and inputs to 
domestic production. 
 
Worldwide, biosecurity restrictions on goods imports have often constituted a form of 
economic protection for domestic agriculture and other primary industries.  Overall for 
developed countries such as New Zealand, that combine generally low tariffs with a 
strong awareness of biosecurity issues, they probably now constitute the most 
significant restraint on trade.  A country’s trading partners will accordingly monitor its 
biosecurity policies and practices with a sceptical eye.  Countries’ international 
obligations are codified in the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement) that took effect in 1994.  This is making 
it harder for countries to use biosecurity restrictions for anything other than biosecurity 
objectives.  As a net exporter of food products, New Zealand gains from an effective 
SPS.  Conversely, should New Zealand’s biosecurity measures fail to satisfy its WTO 
obligations then the export sector is vulnerable to retaliation. 
 
Biosecurity restrictions applied to incoming passengers involve compliance and 
processing costs.  In the case of visitors to NZ these could be negative for tourism - 
though might also have positive effects, by signalling that we are serious about 
protecting biodiversity that they have come to visit. 
 
                                                 
3  These terms have statutory definitions, see below.  
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Benefits and Costs of Additional Biosecurity Restrictions 
Benefits  Costs  
Reduction in risks to 
- production sector 
- indigenous flora, fauna, marine life 
- public health 




Risk of trading-partner retaliation 
Compliance and processing costs for passengers 
 
For example, suppose that New Zealand’s biosecurity restrictions were intensified by 
imposing a ban on all imports of fruit, both as goods imports and those brought in by 
passengers, accompanied by more rigorous inspection procedures. Then: 
 
•  New Zealand would face fewer incursions of unwanted organisms.  There would be 
less need for new containment and control programmes within New Zealand, 
and/or less potential damage to the production sector, to indigenous flora and 
fauna and marine life, and to human health. 
•  Consumers would only be able to buy fruit that could be grown in New Zealand, 
and then only when in season.  Passengers would face additional delays and 
searches.  Fruit exporting countries might initiate dispute proceedings under the 
WTO and, if successful, impose retaliatory tariffs against New Zealand exports.    
Both the benefits and costs of biosecurity restrictions depend importantly on the extent 
of compliance with them.  A restriction that is circumvented (by for example a false 
declaration) will not realise benefits but will still involve costs.  
 
Comment 
Biosecurity measures at the border impose costs on the New Zealand economy, and 
measures that are inconsistent with our SPS obligations risk further costs.  So getting 
the right balance between benefits and costs is important.  The risk management 
approach seeks to balance these costs against the risk of the establishment of 
unwanted organisms, by applying restrictions (and inspection and clearance resources) 
on a targeted basis.  This requires, for a start, a good scientific understanding of 
unwanted organisms, of their chances of becoming established and of the damage 
they could do if established.  It would be appropriate to go to great lengths to prevent 
the entry of an organism that could easily become established and would likely cause 
significant damage. 
 
From a public choice perspective, an issue is whether the line-up of the different 
interest groups involved is likely to push decision-making on biosecurity in the direction 
of inappropriately high, or inappropriately low, levels of biosecurity.  As it happens, a 
variety of interest groups have a stake in biosecurity at the border, and are well 
organised and able to scrutinise regulatory behaviour.  The balance of lobbying 
pressure will likely vary from issue to issue though.  For example, the tourism industry 
can be expected to oppose onerous inspection procedures applied to incoming 
passengers, and similarly our major trading partners can be expected to do so in 
respect of incoming goods. Environmental groups will likely support strict biosecurity 
measures to protect indigenous biodiversity.  Primary producers are in an ambivalent  
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position: they will favour strict controls to protect primary production - but not to the 
point of triggering retaliation in export markets.  
 
2.2. Regulation 
The statutory basis for biosecurity measures applied at the border is Part III 
(Importation of Risk Goods) of the Biosecurity Act 1993.  The key concepts in Part III 
are those of risk goods, import health standards, and biosecurity clearance.  
 
Risk goods are (s2): 
 
any organism, organic material, or other thing, or substance, that (by reason of its 
nature, origin or other relevant factors) it is reasonable to suspect constitutes, 
harbours, or contains an organism that may – 
(a)  cause unwanted harm to natural and physical resources or human health in 
New Zealand; or 
(b)  interfere with the diagnosis, management or treatment, in New Zealand, of 
pests or unwanted organisms
4. 
 
Whether or not a particular shipment constitutes risk goods is basically a matter of 
judgement by inspectors appointed under the Act, on the basis of the information 
available to them. The definition is a wide and risk-averse one: an inspector is only 
required to have reasonable grounds to suspect that a shipment may cause unwanted 
harm.     
 
Import health standards are at the heart of biosecurity restrictions at and beyond the 
border.  They can apply to risk goods of a certain kind or description imported from one 
or more countries or locations.  A standard specifies (s22): 
 
the requirements to be met for the effective management of risks associated with 
the importation of risk goods before those goods may be imported .. or given a 
biosecurity clearance. 
 
Both current and proposed import health standards are available on the MAF web site, 
and their preparation must include consultation with affected interest groups and 
departments. There is no obligation to develop an import health standard if imports of 
the risk good (even under restrictions) would pose unacceptable risks.  An import 
health standard can be revoked, which has the effect of banning the entry of the goods.  
 
Lastly, an inspector cannot give a biosecurity clearance (for entry into New Zealand) 
unless (s27) satisfied that the goods are either not risk goods, or alternatively satisfied: 
 
(a) that the goods comply with the requirements specified in an import health 
standard .. and 
.. 
(d) that the goods display no signs of harbouring organisms that may be 
unwanted organisms.  
 
                                                 
4  These terms have statutory definitions in domestic biosecurity legislation.  See below.  
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In effect, any goods that are held to be risk goods will not be allowed entry unless they 
are covered by, and comply with, an import health standard,  and show no obvious 
signs of unwanted organisms. 
 
These provisions apply to the personal effects and baggage of arriving travellers as 
well as to all other goods imports.  They are accompanied by powers to direct the 
movement of craft, goods and travellers, by powers to obtain information, by powers of 
search and detention, and by powers to treat, destroy or refuse admittance to risk 
goods.   
 
Comment 
Regulatory powers for biosecurity at the border are very extensive, but it is not 
apparent that they could or should be scaled back.  On the assumption that they will 
need to be used in certain circumstances, the issue is more the quality of the analysis 
that precedes their application – see below. 
 
It is interesting that the exercise of these regulatory powers does not normally involve 
any role for the Minister of Biosecurity.  This is in contrast to domestic biosecurity 
regulation.   
 
While the content of import health standards is on the public record, there seems to be 
less transparency over what other goods – in addition to those covered by health 
standards – have been assessed to be risk goods, and why. There could be a case for 
a public database of decisions on risk goods. 
 
2.3. Risk analysis and the level of protection 
This section describes the requirements that apply to risk analysis.  Explicit 
requirements apply to the preparation of import health standards.  Under the Act, the 
preparation of a standard must have regard to: 
 
(a)  the likelihood that goods of the kind or description to be specified in the import 
health standard may bring organisms into New Zealand; 
 
(b)  the nature and possible effect on people, the New Zealand environment, and 
the New Zealand economy of any organisms that goods of the kind or 
description specified in the import health standard may bring into New 
Zealand; 
 
(c)  New Zealand’s international obligations. 
 
Two terms in this requirement are of particular significance.  First, ‘environment’ is 
given a wide definition in the Act: 
 
(a) ecosystems and their constituent parts, including people and their 
communities; 
 
(b) all natural and physical resources; 
 
(c)  amenity values; 
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(d) the aesthetic, cultural, economic and social conditions that affect or are 
affected by (a) to (c). 
 
Second, ‘international obligations’ are international agreements that are of treaty 
status, and include the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (1994) (the SPS agreement); the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (1992); and the International Plant Convention (1952).  The most directly 
applicable is the SPS agreement, in particular its Article 5.  Biosecurity measures 
(including but not limited to import health standards) are to be  
 
based on an assessment .. of the risks to human, animal or health, taking into 
account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international 
organizations .. Members shall take into account available scientific evidence; 
relevant processes and production methods; relevant inspection, sampling and 
testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence of pest- or 
disease-free areas; relevant ecological and environmental conditions .. 
 
In assessing the risks and determining the biosecurity measures to be applied for 
achieving the appropriate level of protection  
 
Members shall take into account as relevant economic factors: the potential 
damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the event of the entry, 
establishment or spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control or eradication in 
the territory of the importing Member; and the relative cost-effectiveness of 
alternative approaches to limiting risks.” 
 
The appropriate level of protection should 
 
take into account the objective of minimising negative trade effects .. 
avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels appropriate in different 
situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade. 
 
The application of precaution is constrained by the requirement that 
 
in cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may 
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available 
pertinent information .. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the 
additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and 
review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly. 
 
In these requirements the term 'appropriate level of protection against risks' is peculiar 
to the SPS agreement.  The concept is, however, the familiar one of striking an 
appropriate balance between biosecurity risks and the resource costs and restrictions 
involved in mitigating them.   
 
Comment 
The requirements for risk analysis for import health standards, which are set out in 
legislation and in the SPS agreement, are comprehensive and rigorous.  The 
Biosecurity Authority’s policy statement on risk analysis (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, 2001) together with a casual (and  non-technical) review of some of the  
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analyses and explanatory material on the Authority’s web site, provide a degree of 
assurance that these requirements are being professionally implemented.   
 
Neither the Act nor the SPS require biosecurity risk analysis to incorporate any explicit 
consideration of the trade related-costs of proposed restrictions.  Indeed the SPS 
agreement (quoted above) does not include them in its list of ‘relevant economic 
factors’.  On the other hand “there appears to be nothing in the SPS agreement that 
prevents a wider consideration of costs and benefits as being the basis for distinctions 
between situations of comparable risk, when determining levels of protection” (Sinner 
and Gibbs, 1998, p51). 
 
One route by which they can be brought into account would seem to be the SPS 
requirement that the ‘appropriate’ level of protection should take into account the 
objective of minimising negative trade effects.  It has proven to be difficult, however, to 
establish benchmarks for this level.  W hile it is feasible to achieve a consistent 
approach to closely related biosecurity measures, it is difficult to do so in other 
circumstances, or at an overall level.  The issues here are being addressed in the 
context of the current development of a biosecurity strategy.  
 
Barrat et al (2000) examine the adequacy of current procedures for integrating 
considerations of risk to indigenous flora and fauna into biosecurity risk decisions at the 
border.  Their view is that practice in New Zealand and Australia is farther advanced 
than elsewhere but improvements could be made in risk identification, in information 
availability and in the use of expert advice.   
 
Risk analysis and management methodology varies somewhat across biosecurity-
related international agreements, and there are also differences with the Australia-New 
Zealand standard on risk management (Standards New Zealand,1999).  These are all 
compared in Sinner and Sinner and Gibbs (1998).  They mostly involve differences in 
terminology and how the various steps in the process are ordered.  
   
2.4. Resource allocation and cost recovery  
The allocation of resources to biosecurity functions at the border  – for example, 
decisions on the number of inspectors to employ – is the outcome of both: 
 
•  the biosecurity standards that have been set (on which see above): 
•  inflows of passengers and goods and the level of risk associated with them. 
Resource requirements do not solely depend on the overall volume of goods and 
passengers.  They are also affected by the number of different entry points (which has 
been rising as more regional airports provide international services), by peaks in the 
pattern of daily arrivals, and by changes in the biosecurity risks associated with 
different pathways or countries of origin. 
 
The Annex to this paper contains a very simple model of the comparative statics of 
resourcing biosecurity measures.  The main result is that whatever is the optimal rate 
of detection of unwanted organisms in particular circumstances, it should be 
maintained as traffic volumes increase.  The implication is that total costs will rise. 
 
Cost recovery is subject to ss135-142 of the Biosecurity Act.  Costs are to be 
recovered “in accordance with the principles of equity and efficiency”, while any levies  
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are only to be raised from persons who will either benefit from the provision of the 
service whose costs are recovered, or create risks, which make it necessary (s139).   
 
Cost recovery for border and pre-border biosecurity measures is directed at the latter 
category (NZIER, 1999).  Actual practice varies, though (Crump 2000): 
 
•  container and cargo (including vehicle) biosecurity costs are recovered from 
importers; 
•  mail biosecurity costs are funded by the Crown (i.e., the taxpayer); 
•  passenger, aircraft and vessel biosecurity costs are mostly not being recovered. 
On the last point, the previous government decided in 1997 to extend cost recovery 
from regional international airports (where costs had been recovered since they 
opened to international traffic in the early 1990s) to Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch airports in 1998 (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 1998b).  As a result 
of litigation this extension was postponed to 2000.  The present government has 
extended this delay indefinitely, and is also in litigation with the regional airports. 
 
Comment 
There is a contrast between cost recovery for containers and cargo, which is well 
established, and the arguments around cost recovery for passengers and craft.  The 
latter has involved disputes about the rights and obligations of passengers, carriers and 
port companies, about which can be regarded as creating biosecurity risks, and the 
effect of new charges on existing rights.  These are in part issues of equity, and a 
consensus seems unlikely.  The efficiency case for cost recovery for passengers and 
craft, from port companies or carriers, is summarised in the table below.  This sets out 




Inspection and Clearance of Passengers, Aircraft and Vessels:  
Potential Effects of Cost Recovery 
Issue  Potential effcect  Effect if costs 
recovered from port 
companies 





Passengers comply with 
requirements 
Recovery will not 
affect behaviour 
Recovery will not 
affect behaviour 
Biosecurity risks 
– aircraft and 
vessels 
Carriers comply with 
requirements 
Depends on 
structure of port 
charges to carriers 
Depends on 




Those charged are able to 
monitor allocation of resources 
and efficiency of use 




Decisions on additional 
capacity take account of 
implications for biosecurity 
costs 
Yes if location-
specific costs are 
recovered at all ports 
Yes if location-
specific costs are 
recovered at all 
ports 
                                                 
5  See also NZIER (1998).  
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3.  BIOSECURITY WITHIN NEW ZEALAND 
Biosecurity measures within New Zealand comprise: 
 
•  monitoring programmes such as bait traps and visual searches that are intended to 
ascertain the presence and extent of unwanted organisms in New Zealand;,  
•  control and eradication programmes such as sprays and poisoned bait that are 
intended to either eradicate unwanted organisms if that is cost-effective, or limit or 
manage them if not. 
3.1  Benefits and costs 
Disentangling the benefits and costs of domestic biosecurity measures is not entirely 
straightforward, for they can be closely inter-related.  It is important to avoid double 
counting or omissions.   
 
In particular, the benefits of domestic biosecurity include: 
 
•  the reduction in production losses (or in biodiversity, or in health status) associated 
with controlling or eliminating an infestation; 
•  the removal of any biosecurity restrictions that have been imposed on us by our 
export markets. 
The costs of domestic biosecurity comprise: 
 
•  the compliance and administrative costs of assembling information on the presence 
and distribution of pests and unwanted organisms; 
•  the costs of vaccination, fumigation or poisoning, and of the precautionary 
destruction of livestock; 
•  the value of the livestock destroyed;  
•  the compliance and administrative costs of movement controls; 
•  collateral damage, for example by biological control agents to indigenous flora or 
fauna; 
•  the costs of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the biosecurity programme.  
Comment 
While the same risk-management approach should be applied to domestic biosecurity 
measures as to those at the border, the options to be considered will differ.  They 
centre on: 
 
•  the extent of active surveillance (in the form of additional traps and surveys) versus 
passive surveillance (relying on existing monitoring and reporting); 
•  whether to attempt to eradicate an incursion or established population;   
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•  whether to attempt to limit its further establishment within New Zealand;  
•  whether to take no action. 
If the organism is already widely established, or climatic or other natural barriers limit 
propagation between regions, then what are at stake may be regional, rather than 
national, costs and benefits.  Hence the option (see below) of regional rather than 
national decisions on the appropriate level of biosecurity measures and of who should 
pay for what. 
 
The benefits and costs of containment or eradication are subject to technical 
uncertainty when an organism is present in an environment that is novel to it.  Climate, 
potential predators and potential food sources may all differ.  As a result little may be 
known about its likely speed of establishment, environmental effects, or the 
effectiveness of treatment options.  This argues for a ‘learning by doing’ approach in 
which initial measures are designed to generate information as well as yield short-term 
eradication or containment results. 
 
3.2  Regulation: unwanted and notifiable organisms 
The starting point for domestic biosecurity measures combines Part IV (Surveillance 
and Prevention) and part VI (Administrative Provisions) of the Biosecurity Act 1993.  
The key concepts are unwanted organism and notifiable organism. 
 
An unwanted organism is (s2): 
 
any organism t hat a chief technical officer believes is capable or potentially 
capable of causing unwanted harm to any natural and physical resources or 
human health. 
 
Significant powers and responsibilities follow from assessment as an unwanted 
organism.  An inspector may:  
 
•  require any person to provide information on the presence of any unwanted 
organism (s43);  
•  may without a warrant enter and inspect any place (other than a dwelling or marae) 
to confirm the presence or absence of an unwanted organism, or to take any action 
necessary to eradicate it or stop its spread. (ss109, 114); 
•  direct the occupier of any place or the owner of any organism to treat or destroy 
any material that may be contaminated with or harbour an unwanted organism 
(s122). 
Notifiable organisms involve additional reporting obligations:  a person who suspects 
the presence of a notifiable organism has a duty to report it without delay and not wait 





Department/ Category  Number  Comment 
Agriculture and Forestry     
§  subject to management 
strategies
a 
5  Includes bovine TB and American foulbrood. 
§  specified in import health 
standards
b 
210   
§  notifiable  165  Includes BSE and foot-and-mouth disease. 
§  other  159  Mostly not established but includes RCD. 
ERMA  48  Organisms prohibited entry under HASNO. 
Dept of Conservation   16   Mostly frogs. 
Health
c  7  Mosquitoes. 
Fisheries   1  Undaria seaweed. 
 
a.  See page 13 below. 
b.  Import health standards also address the risks posed by a very wide range of organisms that do not 
have the legal status of ‘unwanted organisms’ and the domestic reporting requirements that go with 
that status.  
c.  The Ministry of Health also has other legislative options for dealing with public health risks. 
 
Comment 
The list of unwanted organisms is the gateway to the domestic powers and obligations 
of the Biosecurity Act, in that inclusion on the list enables the Act’s powers to be 
exercised, and its obligations to be enforced.  This is the case regardless of whether or 
not an unwanted organism is the subject of a pest management strategy.   
 
An organism can be included on the list if their entry or spread would cause ‘unwanted 
harm’; or put another way, if its eradication or control would bring benefits.  There is no 
obligation to take action simply because an organism is ‘unwanted’
6.  In any particular 
case the costs of action has to be assessed against those benefits.  But there is, 
nonetheless, a case for a regular review of the list. 
 
3.3  Pest management strategies 
Part V (Pest Management) of the Act establishes regulatory structures within which the 
powers that are available under Parts IV and VI of the Act can be exercised.  Pest 
Management Strategies are intended to manage or eradicate particular unwanted 
organisms.  They can apply at the national or regional levels.  Simplified arrangements 
can be implemented for small-scale local programmes. 
 
There are extensive legislative requirements for national strategies.  A Minister must, 
even before publicly releasing proposals, be satisfied that they meet various statutory 
                                                 
6 Though goods cannot be given a biosecurity clearance if they show signs of harbouring 
unwanted organisms (see page 6).  
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criteria, including that their benefits outweigh their costs and that the net benefits of a 
national intervention exceed those of a regional one (s57).  The proposals themselves 
must provide information on the strategy under 22 headings (ss60, 61).  A board on 
inquiry will normally be convened to consider and report on submissions (ss 63-67).   
 
The Minister must take that report, and a report by the appropriate chief executive, into 
account, before finalising the strategy (s69).  The strategy itself must specify 10 
different matters and might include one or more of 19 categories of rules that require or 
prohibit particular actions (ss69A, 69B).  Strategies must be reviewed at least every 
five years 
 
Additional and detailed requirements apply where a strategy is to be funded by levies 
(ss90 to 96).  In particular, the Minister must be satisfied that (s92f): 
 
Overall, the benefits to the group of persons who will be responsible for paying the 
levy outweigh the costs to them of the imposition, collection and payment of the 
levy. 
 
The only two current national strategies are in respect of: 
 
•  Bovine tuberculosis, which is spread by possums and affects cattle; 
•  American foulbrood, which affects bees. 
Regional pest management strategies are subject to similar process and content 
requirements.  There are a large number in operation applying to both plant and animal 
pests.  These commonly require landowners to organise and fund control or eradication 




The structure of a pest management strategy  – including objectives, planning and 
consultation requirements - is commensurate with the powers and obligations available 
under the Act.  It is for this reason that a recent review of the response to the incursion 
of Painted Apple Moth in Auckland (Liebhold A and Simpson B, 2001) recommends 
that a pest management strategy be developed for that pest as a matter of urgency.  
The statutory requirements for pest management strategies are, however, very 
detailed, and complying with them requires significant resources and time.  Pest 
management strategies in their current form can at best only constitute a medium-term 
response to a biosecurity problem.  Even if a pest management strategy would be an 
appropriate institutional response to a biosecurity problem, departments may be 
reluctant to embark on the process, and opt for ad-hoc measures instead (see next 
section).   
 
While the procedural hurdles also apply at the regional level, regional councils have 
been far readier to establish pest management strategies.  This may be attributable to: 
 
•  while central government has options other than national pest management 
strategies (see below) that is not the case for regional councils;  
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•  the landowner funding of control and eradication activities, along with funding 
regional councils’ own costs from the general rates, seems to be generally 
accepted7. 
3.4  Other domestic biosecurity responses 
While the levy raising and rating powers of ss 90-100 of the Act are only available for 
pest management strategies, the Government can exercise the powers available for 
unwanted organisms independently of a pest management strategy - as long as it is 
prepared to meet the costs itself.  
 
This currently the case for the varroa bee mite, for which a two-year management plan 
is now being implemented.  It is intended that this be eventually replaced by a pest 
management strategy if this can be agreed.   
 
Avocadoes are another case where biosecurity actions are being developed outside 
the framework of a pest management strategy.  There is joint industry/government 
agreement on a surveillance programme and on a contingency plan that would be 
implemented in the event of the incursion of an avocado pest. 
 
Another important example is plantation forestry, where a surveillance programme is 
managed and funded by forest owners. 
 
Comment 
While the development of pest management strategies is subject to extensive 
legislative requirements, there is no statutory requirement for any form of process to be 
followed, or analysis to be undertaken, before action is taken  outside of a pest 
management strategy.  The Government can take action on the basis of whatever 
analysis as it sees fit.   
 
A quick review of some recent analyses, however, indicates that in practice quite 
extensive analysis has been undertaken to justify the funding sought (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 2000a and 2000b, NZIER 1997).  Guidelines for this process 
are now being drafted, which is a welcome development. 
 
While there are statutory review mechanisms for pest management strategies, this is 
not the case for the use of the Act’s powers when they are exercised outside of pest 
management strategies.  There would seem to be a good case for an ex-post review 
both of the management process and of the benefits and costs of a biosecurity 
operation 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
There is a lot at stake in biosecurity, both for the production sector and for the 
environment and public health.  The powers that are available to be exercised are also 
very extensive.  It is therefore doubly important that biosecurity risk management 
responses are preceded by high quality analysis that is based on the best available 
information, and by a transparent decision-making process.  The situation is somewhat 
                                                 
7 Other approaches, involving for example separate and specific rates, might better align cost 
recovery with benefits, but are procedurally more complex.  
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uneven in these respects, as between incoming goods and passengers, and as 
between pest management strategies and other domestic responses.    This partly 
reflects an uneven approach in the Biosecurity Act; the presence or absence of interest 
groups able to monitor or contest decisions; and (linked to that second point) different 
policies on cost recovery.   
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6.  ANNEX: RESOURCING BIOSECURITY PROGRAMMES 
We are interested in how the resourcing of biosecurity activities might vary in response 
to changes in such factors as the volume of trade or the expected damage from an 
incursion.  Here is a very simple model that throws some light on the issue. 
 
We consider a pathway of possible entry for unwanted organisms into New Zealand, 
for example passenger or container entry through a particular port.  Let: 
 
D =  expected or risk-adjusted cost of the entry of an unwanted organism (taking into 
account the likelihood of its subsequent establishment and other factors) 
 
N =  number of units (passengers or containers) entering the pathway 
 
s =  the detection rate, being the proportion of organisms intercepted.  We take this as 
the decision variable, as it can be monitored ex-post and inspection procedures 
adjusted so as to attain it (Whyte, 1996a, and Whyte, 1996b).  We are interested 
in the optimal detection rate and how this would vary with changes in the other 
parameters 
 
c =  unit variable costs of inspection, which is an increasing function of s, characterised 
by diminishing returns to additional spending 
 
p = proportion of units conveying unwanted organisms; taken to be a function of s in 
that a higher level of s will have a signalling or deterrent effect on  p, so that  
0 < ¶ ¶ s p  
 
The total number of organisms entering undetected is (1-s)pN and so the expected 
cost associated with the pathway is:  
 (1-s)pND. 
The marginal reduction in this cost, as a result of a marginal increase in the detection 
rate of ds, is: 
 
  ( ) ( )ND s s s p sND p - ¶ ¶ - + 1 d d  
The first term in this expression represents the direct impact of a change in s on the 
number of undetected entries.  The second represents the indirect impact via a 
signalling effect on  p, the proportion  of arriving passengers or containers that are 
conveying unwanted organisms. 
 
The increase in the variable costs of the inspection programme, as a result of a 
marginal increase in the detection rate of ds, is: 
 
   ( ) sN s c d ¶ ¶  
 
The marginal benefit of increasing the programme is accordingly greater than its 
marginal cost if: 
 
  ( )( ) ( ) D s c s s p p ¶ ¶ > - ¶ ¶ - + 1   
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The left hand side is a function of s, which (as  0 < ¶ ¶ s p ) declines as s increases.  The 
right hand side is an increasing function of s. 
 
If the inequality holds for all values of s then it will be worthwhile to allocate sufficient 
resources so as to detect everything.  If it does not hold for any value of s then the 
detection programme should be abandoned.   
 
If the inequality only holds up to some value of s then the programme should target that 




Several conclusions can be drawn: 
 
1.  The optimal level of s (the proportion detected) is not affected by N (the number 
of passengers or containers entering).  So if traffic volumes rise, the detection 
rate should be maintained by increasing inspection activity.  Costs will rise in 
consequence. 
 
2.  If  D (the risk-adjusted cost of entry of an unwanted organism) is revised 
upward/downward then s should be increased/reduced. 
 
3.  If  p, the proportion of units conveying unwanted organisms, rises/falls, then so 
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